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2ABSTRACT
This paper asks whether there is an inverse relationship between size of farm and
output per unit of land in rural Vietnam. Evidence indicates that access to land has become
increasingly stratified, and that changes in the choice of technique have also occurred. It is
demonstrated that agrarian production and productivity have been unleashed as a result of
these changes. Decomposing the sources of accumulation, it is demonstrated that pur-
chased machinery and equipment are an important source of growth. Evidence from the
Mekong Delta indicates that farms of different sizes appear to utilize different technical
coefficients of production, and that these differences in production systems appear to have
an effect on yields. As a consequence, an inverse relationship between size of farm and
output per unit of land cannot be substantiated.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
In an important paper published two decades ago, Francesca Bray argued that ‘wet-
rice cultivation is not…subject to economies of scale’ (Bray, 1983: 19). According to
Bray, this is because growth in yields in wet-rice societies is a result of the intensification
of farming, in which, given restricted technical coefficients of production, double crop-
ping, transplanting, judicious seed selection and the application of fertilizers serves to raise
productivity. These productivity enhancements are supposedly both scale- and resource-
neutral (Mooij, 2000: 217). As a result, in ‘wet-rice societies there is little trend towards
the consolidation of holdings and the polarization of rural society into managerial farmers
and landless labourers’ (Bray, 1983: 13).
Bray’s argument was subjected to a vigorous critique a decade ago, when White
(1989: 23) argued that the characteristics of a crop could not explain the presence or ab-
sence of rural class polarization. The purpose of this paper is not to revisit White’s critique,
but to add to it, by placing Bray’s argument within a long-standing debate in agrarian po-
litical economy. According to Bray, the capacity of small-sized farms to utilize scale- and
resource-neutral production intensification measures facilitates productivity improvements,
which means that smaller farms generate, on a per unit of land basis, higher yields than
larger farms. In other words, there is an inverse relationship between rice output per unit of
land and farm size that helps explain why ‘a farm of two hectares will support a family’
(Bray, 1983: 9). This paper questions this argument, in the context of one specific wet-rice
economy: Vietnam. Macrolevel production data and microlevel field research are used to
suggest that Vietnam’s rice economy does not appear to clearly demonstrate the presence
of an inverse relationship between size of holding and productivity per unit of land, as
would be expected according to Bray’s argument. The paper will demonstrate that access
to land is becoming stratified, albeit from a narrow base. Further, the paper will demon-
strate that differences in the technical coefficients of production can be witnessed between
farm households when grouped according to size of operational holding. It will be argued
that this refashioning of the production system governing rice cultivation is a consequence
of the transformation in rural relations of production resulting from the decollectivization
of Vietnamese agriculture in the 1980s and that these processes can explain why the evi-
dence needed to substantiate the presence of an inverse relationship is in doubt.
2The paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, section II briefly
reviews the inverse relationship, arguing that it is a highly contested field of enquiry within
agrarian political economy. Section III examines the process of agrarian transition in Viet-
nam since the early 1980s, and documents the outcome of this process for food crop pro-
duction, productivity, and the agrarian structure of rural Vietnam. It is demonstrated that
access to land is become stratified. Section IV reviews existing macrolevel evidence on the
sources of agrarian accumulation in Vietnam, and demonstrates that growth appears to be
linked to the choice of technique. In particular, the use of modern machinery and equip-
ment are important determinants of growth. Section V provides field-level evidence from
two surveys that complements the findings of section IV. The data tentatively suggests that
when grouped by size of operational holding, there are clear differences between farms in
the technical coefficients of production. In particular, larger farms appear to use a choice of
technique that is more intensive in its used of hired labour-power and capital equipment.
The data also appears to indicate appears to indicate that it is these farms that are, to a
greater or lesser extent, more productive, in terms of yields per unit of land. Thus, the field
evidence needed to substantiate the presence of an inverse relationship in Vietnamese agri-
culture is not found. It is suggested that this evidence may appear to indicate the emer-
gence of a small strata of richer peasants that use a choice of technique that is more inten-
sive in its use of hired labour-power and capital equipment than the small peasants that
dominate the Vietnamese countryside. It will be further suggested that in this light it is not
surprising that the evidence needed to substantiate the presence of an inverse relationship
is weak: it is possible that farm productivity may have become linked to the scale of pro-
duction as accumulation has proceeded in rural Vietnam. Section VI offers some conclu-
sions.
2. THE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP
Ellis (1993: 206) has succinctly summed up the finding that ‘a volume of evidence
across different countries seems to reveal an inverse relationship between farm size and
yields per unit area’. The origin of this revelation lies in evidence collected in pre-
revolutionary Russia and China. However, there can be little doubt that it was the volumi-
nous theoretical and empirical debate that took place in India in the 1960s that led to the
3inverse relationship becoming a key debate within agrarian political economy (see Dyer,
1997: 23, fn 4 for an extensive set of references).
Berry and Cline (1979) are commonly regarded as the definitive statement on the
inverse relationship. In a study encompassing evidence from Asia and Latin America, they
find that the data consistently demonstrates that small farms have greater total factor pro-
ductivity (Berry and Cline, 1979: 16). Their findings suggest in turn that small farms pro-
vide the maximum output given the available land area, foster superior rates of labour ab-
sorption, and thus promote a more equitable distribution of income. They conclude that the
‘expansion of the small-farm subsector of agriculture’ through vigorous land reform poli-
cies ‘warrants serious consideration in almost all developing countries’ (Berry and Cline,
1979: 4). Since the publication of Berry and Cline’s work, ‘the constant generation and
analysis of data…continues to confirm the finding of an inverse relationship’ (Dyer, 1997:
10).
The evidence supporting the presence of the inverse relationship is that of a statisti-
cally significant association. If this is the case, it is necessary to elaborate possible expla-
nations as to why this association is witnessed. In a comprehensive review of the literature,
Dyer (1997) has identified three general classes of explanation. The first is land fertility,
and is based upon the argument that smaller farms are located on land of better quality.
This could be a consequence of land fragmentation through inheritance, or a result of in-
vestment patterns amongst larger farms that focus upon the most productive land in order
to maximize the return from the investment. It could also be a consequence of the fact that,
as several studies in India indicate, smaller farms may have a larger share of their farm un-
der irrigation (Rao, 1963). However, there is no reason to assume that inheritance patterns
result in the inequitable distribution of the best land, to the detriment of some inheritors
and the benefit of other inheritors. There is also no reason to assume that larger farms,
notwithstanding the possibility that they may disproportionately invest in more productive
land, are still not investing absolute amounts per unit of less productive land that exceeds
that of small farms located on similar, less productive land. Finally, evidence on the share
of farm area under irrigation does not account for ‘the quality of irrigation facilities on
various farm sizes, nor its effectiveness’ (Dyer, 1997: 35). It would thus appear that land
fertility explanations should more properly be described as hypotheses.
4The second general class of explanation contains two separate, but interrelated, ar-
guments. The first argument is that farms become more complex organizations as they be-
come larger, and are thus subject to managerial diseconomies of scale. Smaller farms do
not face this constraint, and are thus, on a per unit basis, more productive. One particular
managerial advantage of small farms is a greater knowledge of local agroecological condi-
tions, which can permit greater intensity of land usage as well as a more optimal choice of
crop mix. As Dyer stresses, even if this were a plausible possibility, it would still be neces-
sary to assess whether managerial diseconomies could be potentially offset by technical
economies of scale. It could also be mentioned that superior local knowledge is wholly
consistent with asymmetrical regional, national and international information, which could
more than offset the supposed benefits of being small. As a consequence, the organiza-
tional argument ‘is not wholly convincing’ (Dyer, 1997: 29). The second argument is re-
lated to the first, in that it is suggested that as farms increase in size and become more
complex organizations, they have to increasingly manage wage labour. Wage labour brings
along with it the need to develop appropriate incentive structures, which entail additional
costs, as well as the associated costs of supervising wage labour. By way of contrast, small
farms, in that they rely heavily on family labour, face much lower motivational and super-
visory costs. The problem with this argument is that it assumes that small farms are more
reliant on family labour than on waged labour, and this assumption, while it may be true,
is, again, not so much an explanation as a hypothesis.
The third class of general explanation offered by Dyer is that of factor intensity,
and in particular labour intensity. Derived from a classic paper by Amartya Sen (1962),
this explanation argues that smaller farms use more labour per unit of land than do larger
farms, and this greater labour intensity explains why smaller farms produce greater yields
per unit of land. The reason for this difference is squarely neo-classical in logic: large
farms hire labour, which they pay a wage based on their marginal product. Small farms use
family labour that continues to work until their marginal product equals zero. Berry and
Cline (1979) provide some evidence to support the differential labour intensity explanation
of the inverse relationship. However, Sen’s approach is predicated upon the assumption
that family labour and wage labour are clearly separable categories and that they are per-
5fect substitutes, an assumption that, once again, appears to be more of a hypothesis than an
explanation (Dyer, 1997: 37).
Sen’s theoretical position that small and large farms face different relative prices
for labour has been extended by a number of economists in a deeper neo-classical direction
(see, for example, Bardhan, 1973 or Griffin, 1974). They generalize Sen’s approach, argu-
ing that small and large farms face different relative factor prices for land, labour and
capital. As a result of different relative factor prices, larger farms tend to undervalue the
contribution of land to production, and thereby adopt a choice of technique that promotes
an extension of the cultivated area, or they substitute relatively cheap capital for labour and
mechanize their production process. The analytical problem with this approach, as argued
by Patnaik (1979), is that it ‘assumes the same production function for all farm sizes and
systems of production’ (Dyer, 1997: 41). It is, as Sen (1966: 444) himself admitted, an un-
realistic assumption, one that must, as a consequence, be treated, at best, as a working hy-
pothesis and not as an explanation.
Clearly, the orthodox arguments that have been proposed to explain the inverse re-
lationship are somewhat lacking. As Dyer notes, this is because orthodox explanations that
emphasize differences in quantities of factor inputs are only partial explanations, and be-
cause explanations that emphasize qualitative differences in factor inputs have either logi-
cal or empirical flaws Indeed, even the authoritative Berry and Cline are aware of the ex-
tent of the weaknesses in the arguments. They note that despite the evidence that they
themselves marshal to support the presence of the inverse relationship, it may not be pres-
ent ‘in the very smallest farms in a few countries’ (Berry and Cline, 1979: 128). They also
note that large farms may be able to reap economies of scale if and when they mechanize
their production processes (Berry and Cline, 1979: 138).
In this light, an alternative, class-theoretic explanation of the inverse relationship
has been developed. First explored by Byres (1977), it has been given its fullest expression
in the work of Dyer (1997). Dyer’s argument is that it is the intensity of factor utilization
that must result in the inverse relationship. However, unlike marginalist explanations, that
render factor utilization a function of relative prices, Dyer argues that factor utilization is a
6function of the relations of production, which in agriculture are normally reflected in tenu-
rial relations, and ultimately the differential resource constraints that define class relation-
ships. Dyer thus argues that to understand the inverse relationship it is necessary to place it
within a more dynamic process in which the emergence of differentiated access to the
forces of production is both a result of and an influence upon stratified access to the means
of production and thus peasant class differentiation amongst farm households. With peas-
ant class differentiation, exploitative relationships develop between rural dominant classes
and smaller poor and marginal peasants. Exploitative relationships force factor intensifica-
tion upon poor peasants, and this in turn results in higher cropping intensities, higher la-
bour inputs per hectare, and higher yields. As Dyer writes, ‘the poor peasant maximizes
output because…survival…depends on it…[T]he factors driving a poor peasant to inten-
sify labour effort are more important than the factors permitting him to do so’ (Dyer, 1997:
52). By stressing the central role of exploitation, Dyer’s approach offers a clear alternative
to the orthodox explanations. At the same time, Dyer’s approach also suggests reasons why
the inverse relationship might break down. Simply put, if as a consequence of the devel-
opment of ‘proto-capitalism’ in agriculture technology is introduced that is not scale neu-
tral but rather particularly advantageous for larger scale proto-capitalist farms, then the
survival-driven ‘competitive advantage’ of the smaller, more marginal farm may be more
than offset by the technological edge accorded to larger scale farms that adopt the new
choice of technique. As a consequence, the inverse relationship would break down.
It would be extremely interesting to examine the comparative merits of the ortho-
dox and class-theoretic approaches in the Vietnamese context. Such an examination would
seek to substantiate whether or not an inverse relationship was witnessed, and explain why.
However, data constraints do not permit this kind of comprehensive investigation. Rather,
this paper will seek to demonstrate a somewhat weaker but still important point: namely,
that the available data does not unambiguously demonstrate the presence of an inverse re-
lationship in Vietnamese agriculture  In so doing, the paper will demonstrate that differen-
tiated access to land is developing in rural Vietnam, and that there is evidence of differ-
ences in the technical coefficients of production witnessed across different farm sizes. This
7demonstration is consistent with, if not conclusive evidence in support of, the class-
theoretic approach. Thus, the paper lays a preliminary foundation for more detailed re-
search using a class-theoretic methodology in rural Vietnam.
3. AGRARIAN TRANSITION IN VIETNAM, 1975-2000
Vietnam’s post-unification pre-reform agrarian structure was built upon an exten-
sive collectivization campaign conducted in the north of Vietnam between 1958 and 1960
and in the south of Vietnam between 1976 and 1978. In 1979 the average size of a co-
operative in the north of Vietnam was 202 hectares, on which an average of 378 house-
holds lived and worked (Que, 1998). This average however masked wide variation: in
some areas, co-operatives were in excess of 1000 hectares. Almost 97 per cent of rural
northern Vietnamese households belonged to the 4151 co-operatives that were in existence.
In southern Vietnam, the situation was much different in 1979. In 1979 there were only
272 cooperatives, and in 1980 only 24.5 per cent of farm households belonged to a co-
operative. This figure however conceals regional variations in the south. In the central
coastal regions, by 1980 84 per cent of agricultural households had joined co-operatives, in
which land, animals and other means of production were collectively owned and basic pro-
duction teams established to perform agricultural tasks. By way of contrast, by 1980 in the
Mekong Delta only 1.7 per cent of farm households had joined co-operatives. Moreover, it
would appear that some co-operatives listed as such in official reports did not exist in actu-
ality, with farmers continuing to farm their own individual holdings under the guise of a
notional ‘co-operative’ (Kerkvliet, 1995: 69; Que, 1998: 32). Those farms in the south of
Vietnam that did not join co-operatives continued to work the household’s holding using
predominantly family labour, as they had done before unification. However, the often-
coercive efforts by the state to force households into co-operatives resulted in petty com-
modity production becoming increasingly squeezed. As a consequence, an increasing
amount of land was left fallow and many farm households ‘retreated’ into subsistence
farming predicated upon the singular production of use-values.
In the latter half of the 1970s, when a collective agrarian structure was established
in Vietnam, there was a precipitous decline in per capita foodgrain availability. This de-
cline is illustrated in Figure 1. This occurred despite a sharp rise in foodgrain imports.
8Vietnam was facing an agrarian crisis, and the cause of the crisis was twofold in nature
(Akram-Lodhi, forthcoming). The first cause related to the incentive structure. As has been
noted by Kerkvliet (1995: 68), there was ‘little or no incentive to work diligently nor disin-
centive to farm poorly’ in collective agriculture. Certainly, the incentive structure of col-
lective agriculture resulted in low prices for farm output produced in excess of the quota,
consumer subsidies that devalued the outcomes of collective labour, and an overvalued ex-
change rate that encouraged imports (Men, 1995: 39). Repressed procurement prices in
particular led to a procurement crisis. The second cause related to investment. In the period
between 1976 and 1980 there was an inadequate amount of investment in agriculture. This
was in large part due to the heavy industry bias of the State Planning Commission. The
consequence of inadequate investment in agriculture was that in many parts of the country
the productive capacities of the sector deteriorated in the late 1970s.
The weaknesses of the collectives had long been recognized amongst peasants and
local cadres of what is now known as the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). The suc-
cess of local initiatives in the 1970s to alter the relations of production of collective agri-
culture encouraged the CPV to begin a process of restructuring that ultimately decollectiv-
ized agriculture and unleashed a process of agrarian transition (Akram-Lodhi, forthcom-
ing). Table 1 documents the extensive set of changes to agrarian relations undertaken in
Vietnam since 1979. These changes cover tenurial arrangements, access to inputs, resource
allocation decisions, output marketing and taxation. They have thus fundamentally trans-
formed rural relations of production, replacing central planning with state guided, but
nonetheless market-based commodity production. Of these reforms, probably the most im-
portant are Resolution 10 of 1988, the 1993 Land Law, and, perhaps, Resolution 6 of 1998.
These reforms had the affect of transforming access to land, the principle agricultural
means of production, by reestablishing peasant family farming as the basic production unit
in agrarian Vietnam.
While decollectivization initially resulted in an apparently equitable distribution of
much of the arable land in rural Vietnam, evidence indicates that a stratification of land-
holdings quickly began to emerge. More recent evidence is demonstrated in Table 2, which
arrays landholdings for all households with agricultural land by expenditure quintiles. Of
course, it must be stressed that farms in rural Vietnam are small. The average size of a
9farm in the Mekong Delta in 1998 was 1.2 hectares, and even this was four times the aver-
age size of a farm in the Red River Delta (World Bank, 1998: 10). At the same time, agro-
ecological conditions vary. Nonetheless, in Table 2 it is clear that holdings of land gener-
ally rise with per capita expenditure quintiles. For the wealthiest, holdings of annual crop-
land are almost 1.4 times the area of the poorest expenditure quintile. The differences be-
tween the wealthiest and the poorest expenditure quintiles is even more striking for peren-
nial crop land, with the richest quintile having holdings 6 times the size of the poorest
quintile.  The figures for perennial crops are extremely important, as they suggest the ca-
pacity to shift away from rice production—the principle agricultural use-value—and diver-
sify into higher-value food and industrial crops capable of generating exchange-value. In-
deed, wealthier households have expanded the proportion of their land dedicated to peren-
nial crops during the 1990s. Thus, whereas the wealthiest rural households devoted 15 per
cent of their land to perennial crops in 1993, by 1998 this figure had risen to 37 per cent
(General Statistical Office [GSO], 1994: Table 5.1.1; GSO, 1999: Table 5.1.2).  Such a
shift can, by facilitating further agrarian accumulation by wealthier households, promote
further differentiation of agrarian assets. It is, in this light, of interest to note that the num-
ber of households in the 1998 Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS)2 that sold land
was 10 times the number of households that sold land in the 1993 VLSS (GSO, 1994: Ta-
ble 5.1.21; GSO, 1999: Table 5.1.10). The average price of crop land, in current Vietnam-
ese dong (VND), jumped from VND 11.9 million in 1993 to VND 26.1 million in 1998, a
period in which, it can be noted, inflation was very low.  Moreover, it should be noted that
these figures, by excluding land rented-in, probably underestimate the extent of stratifica-
tion of landholdings in rural Vietnam. Even though Vietnam’s rural land market was not
officially recognized at the time, it was quite active by 1998 when, according to the VLSS,
15.3 per cent of farm households rented out land while 5.9 per cent of farm households
rented in land (GSO, 1999: Table 5.1.6).
Mechanisms underpinning land concentration in rural Vietnam have been explored
                                                
2 In 1993 and 1998 the GSO undertook two nationally representative living standards surveys, with financial
and technical assistance from multilateral and bilateral donors. The first Vietnam Living Standards Survey
(VLSS) surveyed 4800 households. The second VLSS surveyed 6000 households, including 4300 that had
been surveyed during the first VLSS.
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in a recent study of one province where the problem appears to be acute (Oxfam (GB),
1999). The study identified seven reasons why rural households had liquidated landhold-
ings. The first reason was formal sector credit, as some people that took out formal loans
for the first time found that they were unable to meet their obligations and had as a conse-
quence been forced to sell their land. The second reason was output failures, which re-
sulted in the need to sell land to repay accumulated debts. The third reason was the opera-
tion of land markets which, although not officially recognized, had made the sale or mort-
gaging of land considerably easier while at the same time serving to exclude those who
lacked land from earning enough money to purchase land. The fourth reason was the in-
creased prosperity of some, which had given them both the resources and the willingness
to buy additional land in order to enhance their productive base. The fifth reason was that
many farmers with a very small holding of land had come to believe that the returns to
productive activity in farming were less than engaging in wage labour. The sixth reason
was that there were more wage labouring opportunities, and thus although rural wages are
low the relative return to rural waged labour has increased. The seventh reason was that
salinization and poor irrigation had, on occasion, led to low land values that had in turn
encouraged sales by very small farmers. It can be noted that these mechanisms have been
confirmed in more recent fieldwork in two southern provinces (Akram-Lodhi, 2001a; Ak-
ram-Lodhi, 2001b).
Four interrelated points can be made regarding the stratification of landholdings in
Vietnam in the 1990s. The first is that landlord tenant relations, including sharecropping,
have returned to rural Vietnam during the 1990s (GSO, 1999: Table 5.1.6), albeit on a lim-
ited scale. Thus, as noted above in 1998 some 15 per cent of agricultural households
rented-in land and some 6 per cent of agricultural households rented-out land. The second
point is that landlessness in rural Vietnam is increasing. In 1993, some 8.2 per cent of rural
households did not have any land. By 1998, this figure had increased to 10.1 per cent
(PWG, 1999: Table 2.4). In 1998, some 9.8 per cent of agricultural households sold land,
but only 2.5 per cent of agricultural households bought land (GSO, 1999: Table 5.1.10).
The growth in landlessness was particularly pronounced in the southeast region around Ho
Chi Minh City, and in the Mekong Delta, the ‘rice bowl’ of Vietnam. The third point is
that fragmentation of landholdings has increased significantly since decollectivization. For
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example, in the Red River Delta, where the average size of a farm is less than 0.3 hectares,
the average number of plots that constitute an operational holding are between 8 and 9
(World Bank, 1998: 10). The fourth point is that the stratification of landholdings helps
explain Resolution 6 of 1998. Although the 1993 Land Law stipulated a maximum farm
size of 3 hectares, by 1995 there were already 113700 farms in excess of 5 hectares and
1900 farms in excess of 10 hectares. Indeed, in some southern provinces it is possible to
come across privately owned farms in excess of 1000 hectares (Akram-Lodhi, 2001a).
While these farms constituted only 1.1 per cent of farm households, it is worth stressing
that 66 per cent of these farms were in the Mekong Delta (World Bank, 1998: 10). In a
sense then Resolution 6 was simply an ex post recognition of changes in the agrarian
structure that had already occurred. In February 2000, when the state reiterated its intention
to implement Resolution 6, it was revealed that these so-called ‘large scale’ farms gener-
ated an average household income of US$7500 per year, well above the average per capita
national income of US$350 (Vietnam Investment Review 14 February 2000). Resolution 6
suggests that there are those in the state and in the CPV that want land stratification to
continue, and that these people have, in effect, won any argument that might have occurred
within the CPV and the state.
Re-emergent peasant farm households have responded to the new agrarian envi-
ronment in rural Vietnam vigorously since decollectivization, transforming the rural labour
process. Table 3 demonstrates changes in the structure of inputs between the late 1970s
and the mid-1990s. As is demonstrated in Table 3, in the period between the late 1970s and
the mid-1990s the amount of arable land per capita declined. However, despite this decline,
the total amount of land devoted to cereal production, primarily rice, increased by 31 per
cent. This extension of the area devoted to rice was accompanied by an intensification of
production. The proportion of the cropped area irrigated increased by more than 28 per
cent; the use of fertilizers increased eightfold, and the number of tractors increased more
than fourfold. Clearly, there have been major changes in the technical coefficients of rice
production in Vietnam. The only area in which the choice of technique did not radically
alter was in the use of hired labour, due to ongoing restrictions on employment issued by
the state. Given such restrictions, it is possible that the resulting distortions in the relative
prices of factor inputs resulted in a ‘capital bias’ in the choice of technique. This possibil-
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ity is examined below. This is not to say however that household farm employment has not
restructured. Between 1993 and 1998 household farm employment of males decreased by
0.3 per cent per annum, while household farm employment of females increased by 0.9 per
cent per annum (PWG, 1999: Table 3.2). Farm production is, in this sense, becoming
‘feminized’.
The aggregate impact of rural restructuring on per capita output in Vietnam was
demonstrated in Figure 1. In order to assess the significance of the growth of foodgrain
production since the late 1980s, median growth rates can be plotted on a scatter plot and a
negative reciprocal regression line fitted to the trend  This is done in Figure 2, which dem-
onstrates a rise in estimated median growth rates from about 2 per cent a year in the early
1960s to about 6.5 per cent a year by the late 1990s. Moreover, just as importantly, the
pattern is heteroscedastic, with variation around the regression line visibly diminishing
over time. Similar patterns can also be observed for food availability and per capita food
availability, although the growth rates are not nearly as dramatic. Clearly, the transforma-
tion in rural relations of production has brought forth a dynamic supply response. As Jan-
sen (1998: 9) observes, the growth in gross agricultural output was a function of two fac-
tors: intensity and yields. In 1987, just prior to formal decollectivization, the ratio of the
sown area to the cultivated area stood at 1.24. The transformation of the relations of pro-
duction resulted in an expansion of double and triple cropping. Thus, the ratio of sown area
to cultivated area has grown rapidly, to stand at 1.43 in 1995. In terms of yields, in 1979-
81 cereal yields per hectare amounted to 2049 kilograms. By 1996-98, this had risen to
3754 kilograms per hectare (World Bank, 2000: Table 3.3). It is a dramatic improvement
in agrarian productivity.
So far, this paper has noted the radical restructuring of rural relations of production
that occurred in Vietnam during the 1980s and 1990s. It has suggested that differentiated
access to land in rural Vietnam has been proceeding, and has further discussed develop-
ments in the use of non-land inputs. Finally, the paper has demonstrated the impressive
supply response that followed from these changes. From a political economy perspective,
there can be little doubt  about the cause of  these processes:  the transformation in rural re-
13
lations of production. The transformation has sharpened the determinate role of the law of
value in rural resource allocation, production and distribution in Vietnamese agriculture.
However, notwithstanding the primary role of the relations of production, how important
have other factors been in agricultural productivity growth? It is to this question that the
paper now turns.
4. SOURCES OF AGRARIAN ACCUMULATION IN VIETNAM
The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and UNDP (2000: 12) have re-
cently argued that ‘the successful growth of agricultural production during the 1990s was
largely due to increased labour and capital inputs, which combined accounted for 87 per
cent of the growth’. It is unclear where the figure claimed by the three institutions comes
from. Therefore, this section will investigate sources of agrarian accumulation in more de-
tail, taking as a given the primary role that should be accorded the transformation in rural
relations of production.
There can be little doubt that investment plays a major role in explaining agrarian
accumulation. As van Donge, White and Nghia (1999: 43) put it, ‘the supply response that
came (about after decollectivization) was possible due to centrally directed investments in
the previous period’. In 1981-1985, the share of investment in agriculture as a proportion
of total government investment was 18.3 per cent (Fforde and de Vylder, 1996). Although
this was a decline relative to 1976-1980, economic circumstances had changed. Vietnam’s
ongoing integration in the trading block of the communist countries gave it access to trade-
based development co-operation, official development assistance, and technical aid, all of
which served to loosen the investment constraints facing the rural economy in the late
1970s. In addition, some of the larger investments made during the late 1970s came on
stream, and started to have an effect on production and productivity. Moreover, between
1986 and 1988, just prior to formal decollectivization, investment in agriculture as a pro-
portion of total government investment increased, to stand at more than 20 per cent, further
loosening the constraints facing the rural economy. It is for this reason that van Donge,
White and Nghia, 1999: 43) stress that ‘in the early eighties massive investments were
made in agriculture’. Much of this investment was directed at further extending the irri-
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gated area in the Red River Delta, while other investments were directed at developing the
production of tropical crops such as coffee and rubber in the Central Highlands.
The growth in the trend rate of growth of foodgrain production demonstrated in
Figure 2 would suggest that the supply response brought about by a reallocation of prop-
erty rights and investment has not exhausted itself. Granted, in the period between 1988
and 1998, the share of public agricultural investment in total public investment was only
on the order of 13 per cent (van Donge, White and Nghia, 1999: 43). Thus, as demon-
strated in Table 4 in 1998 public investment in agriculture constituted 13.9 per cent of total
public investment, 14.7 per cent of the government budget and 3.73 per cent of agricultural
GDP. If agriculture had received investment commensurate with its share of GDP, it would
have received double its allocation of government resources. Moreover, the mid-1990s
boom in foreign direct investment (FDI) into Vietnam—in 1995 FDI was equivalent to 8.8
per cent of GDP—totally missed the agricultural sector. Of the US$16.6 billion of imple-
mented FDI that had flowed into Vietnam by October 2000, only 5.2 per cent had been di-
rected at agriculture and forestry (Vietnam Economic Times, November 2000).
Table 4 and the sectoral allocation of FDI suggest that an explanation for agrarian
accumulation over and above the transformation in the relations of production in the 1980s
and 1990s cannot be public or foreign investment. If investment has played a role in the
1990s, it has been private investment. Unfortunately, data on aggregate private investment
in agriculture is not available, and thus inferences cannot be drawn. However, there are
proxies that suggest that private investment in rural Vietnam in the 1990s increased. As
indicated in Table 1, in the early 1990s Vietnam created a rural financial system. This con-
sists of the Vietnam Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development (VBARD), the People’s
Credit Funds (PCFs), and the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP). The VBARD is the larg-
est rural financial institution, with over 2500 branches (World Bank, 1998: 39). By the end
of 1995, loans to agricultural households accounted for 79 per cent of all credit issued
(Jansen, 1998: 12). At the end of 1997, the VBARD had loans outstanding with 3.7 million
households. Some 67 per cent of these loans were in agriculture, and 80 per cent were short
term. The average size of loan outstanding was US$430, which, it should be noted, was
well in excess of per capita national income (World Bank, 1998: 39). The PCFs had, by the
end of 1997, some 497000 shareholding members, and some VND 1200 billion in loans
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outstanding, an average of US$172 per loan (World Bank, 1998: 39). It can be noted that
the average size of outstanding loan amounted to one-half per capita national income.  The
bulk of these outstanding loans were also short term. The VBP operated through the
VBARD network, and offered loans at subsidized, below-market interest rates to those
deemed ‘poor’.
The creation of the rural financial system may have brought about a significant
change in the structure of access to credit in rural Vietnam. According to the 1997-98
VLSS (GSO, 1999: Table 8.2.1), some 54 per cent of rural households owed money, of
which 43 per cent had been obtained from informal sources.  This situation appears to dif-
fer greatly from that reported in the 1992-93 VLSS (GSO, 1994: Table 8.2.2). In the earlier
survey, some 47 per cent of rural households were indebted. Thus, between 1993 and 1998
rural debt increased. However, in the earlier survey some 73 per cent of rural debt was
owed to informal sources. Thus, between 1993 and 1998 there has been a decline in the
importance of informal sources and a corresponding increase in the importance of formal
rural financial institutions. Finally, in both the earlier and the later survey fewer house-
holds in richer expenditure quintiles were in debt when compared to households in poorer
expenditure quintiles (GSO, 1999: Table 8.2.3; GSO, 1994, Table 8.2.7).
Some 64 per cent of all rural loans in the 1997-98 VLSS had been taken out to ac-
quire working capital, and some 4 per cent had been taken for basic investment (GSO,
1999: Table 8.2.7). Clearly, then, private debt has been used to fund spending on the
means of production, which, it would be thought, would have an effect on agrarian per-
formance. In order to investigate the relationship between the means of production and
agrarian performance, Jansen’s (1998: Table 2) estimates are presented in Table 5. Jansen
constructs a log-linear Cobb Douglas production function in which agricultural output is a
function of land, labour, livestock, fertilizer and machines, in order to estimate the contri-
bution of each factor to output growth and productivity growth.
Table 5 demonstrates that in the period of collective agriculture the attempt to
strengthen co-operative farming led to an expansion of the sown area and investment in
machinery and equipment, although much of this investment was to replace existing ma-
chinery and equipment (Akram-Lodhi, forthcoming). However, the investment and incen-
tive weaknesses of the system fostered declining productivity. Following Directive 100,
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co-operatives shifted to household contracts, in order to improve incentives. Farming in-
tensity increased, as evidenced by the rise in the contribution of fertilizer to growth, and by
the increased importance of labour in agricultural growth. Productivity improved consid-
erably. However, the growth regime engendered by Directive 100 quickly lost momentum,
even though productivity continued to improve. Finally, Resolution 10 formally decollec-
tivized agriculture. This led to an expansion of the sown area. However, it also led to in-
creased application of working capital, in particular fertilizer. Finally, in the presence of
restrictions on the use of labour-power, it also led to spending on investment goods, that is
to say machinery and equipment. Productivity growth per se petered out, and ‘agricultural
growth is…mainly determined by the increase in purchased inputs’ (Jansen, 1998: 11). Of
course, the acquisition of investment goods is consistent with the growth of debt noted
above.
In the introduction, it was noted that Bray argued that wet-rice production utilized
scale-neutral technologies. However, even Berry and Cline (1979) accepted the fact that
mechanization was scale-biased, and could result in a breakdown of the inverse relation-
ship even given the limited technical coefficients used in wet-rice cultivation. If Jansen’s
analysis is correct, it would appear that growth in decollectivized agriculture in Vietnam
has been driven by the purchase of machinery and equipment. This is consistent with the
evidence presented in Table 2, which indicated a shift in the choice of technique between
the collective and decollectivized periods. However, it is well established these inputs are
neither scale- nor resource-neutral. This suggests that it is possible that use of these key
production inputs may be differentiated. If such were the case, there would be differences
in the technical coefficients of production across farms.
It has already been demonstrated by some differentiation in access to land has been
witnessed in rural Vietnam during the 1990s. If there were indeed differences in the tech-
nical coefficients of production found in rice-producing farms, the class-theoretic approach
to the inverse relationship would suggest that the presence of an inverse relationship might
not be able to be substantiated in rural Vietnam. Therefore, the paper now turns to present
evidence on the choice of technique and on yields from two case studies undertaken in the
Mekong Delta in the late 1990s.
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5. THE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP IN VIETNAM: TWO CASE STUDIES
5.1 Case 1
5.1.1 The data
The data used in this section comes from a field survey in 4 provinces of the Me-
kong Delta during May and June 19993. Given that the previous discussion highlights the
possible role of modern machinery and equipment in fostering agrarian growth, one district
in each province was purposively selected because of its relatively high performance in
terms of rice production. Within each district local authorities gave permission to gather
data in two communes that, based on agroecological conditions, visual observation, focus
group discussions and production outcomes, appeared to be reasonably representative of
the district.  Within each commune residences were randomly selected for the survey. In
total, 160 households in the 8 communes were administered a closed question survey ex-
amining the input choices and output outcomes of the 1998-99 winter-spring paddy crop.
The sampling procedure appears to have produced a set of data that is reasonably consis-
tent with that generated by other surveys in the Mekong Delta.
5.1.2. The results of the survey
Table 6 describes the inputs and yields experienced during the 1998-99 winter-
spring paddy crop. In the sample, the average size of a farm was 10.71 cong, with one cong
being equivalent to 1000 square meters. The minimum was 1.6 cong and the maximum
was 36.4 cong. The distribution of farm sizes displayed in Table 6 shows that over 60 per
cent of the farms in the sample were between 5 and 20 cong, and that only 11 per cent of
the farms in the sample had holdings in excess of 20 cong. The distribution of farms in the
sample is consistent with the distribution of farms in the Mekong Delta as a whole (Binh,
2000: 57). In the sample, some 12 per cent of farms lease in some land to supplement their
operational holdings. Those that leased out land tended to be farms with holdings that were
inadequate to support their household, and which therefore opted for participation in the
labour market. However, these households were unwilling to reveal the extent of the land
                                                
3 The survey was conducted by Tran Thuy Binh for their MA thesis, organized under the auspicies of the
Vietnamese-Dutch Project for MA Programme in Development Economics, and is available in the Project
Library.
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that they leased out. Be that as it may, the sample does contain landlords, the Vietnamese
equivalent of owner-occupiers4, and owner-tenants.
Table 6 demonstrates that an average of 67 labour days per hectare was devoted to
the winter-spring rice crop. Although family labour was clearly important for the produc-
tion of the crop, the purchase of labour-power was also very important. Exchange labour,
which had been important in the past, has all but disappeared. As a result, almost 42 per
cent of labour requirements of farms were met through the hiring of labour from the local
labour market. Wage rates varied according to the task that is performed, and were often
paid at a piece rate. Males received wages that were between 1.5 and 2 times that paid to
females. Although more hired labour was used on larger farms than on smaller farms, the
relationship is not linear. It should be noted however that some of the small farms that
hired in labour did so to replace family members who were in fact hiring themselves out to
larger farms. Nonetheless, if the commodification of labour and the concomitant develop-
ment of the labour market is a key structural feature of the development of capitalism
(Lenin, 1968), it would appear that rural capitalism is indeed developing in the sample.
In terms of non-labour inputs, farmers used an average of 262 kilograms of seed
per hectare. There is no systematic relationship between seed utilization and farm size.
Similarly, although farms spent an average of VND 1199000 per hectare on fertilizer, there
is no systematic relationship between fertilizer use and farm size. Surprisingly, however,
Table 6 appears to indicate a broadly inverse relationship between renting machinery and
farm size. Farms of less than 5 cong spent on average VND 1046500 per hectare on ma-
chinery rental, while farms of more than 20 cong spent only VND 877000 per hectare on
machinery rental. The reason for this inverse relationship is that, as demonstrated in Table
6, larger farms owned more machinery and equipment. In Table 6 farms with holdings of
more than 20 cong owned 68.6 per cent more machinery and equipment than those farms
that had holdings of less than 5 cong. Overall, there is a positive relationship between the
value of owned machinery and equipment and farm size.
However, the positive relationship between farm size and size of non-land assets
actually masks the extent of differentiated access to the means of production. Within the
                                                
4 The Vietnamese equivalent of an owner-occupier would be a farm in possession of a land use certificate.
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sample some 55 per cent of households owned no machinery or equipment. These house-
holds all had farms of less than 10 cong. By way of contrast, 9 households owned non-land
assets worth more than VND 5 million, and 4 households had non-land assets worth more
than VND 20 million. These 4 households all had farms of more than 20 cong. The non-
land assets owned by these 4 households consisted of tractors, pumps and threshers. In-
deed, these 4 households possessed 75 per cent of the large tractors that were owned in the
sample. There thus appears to be some differentiation in ownership of technology by size
of farm in the sample.
At the same time, these households—call them ‘rich peasants’—were substituting
hired labour and machinery for family labour. Thus, the 4 households with the highest
value of non-land assets used an average of 31 days of hired labour per hectare on their
holdings of more than 20 cong. When hired labour utilization is arrayed by value of non-
land assets, this was the highest use of hired labour in the sample. There thus appears to be
an emergent group of peasants with larger landholdings, larger amounts of capital stock,
and larger use of hired labour.
This can be contrasted to smaller peasants who do not possess capital stock, and
thus who have a smaller total asset base. Admittedly, the use of hired labour was, at 28
days per hectare when arrayed by value of non-land assets, also high on farms that had a
small non-land asset base and hence a small total asset base. However, the motivation be-
hind the use of labour-power is different between the richer peasants and smaller peasants.
For the small peasants, hired labour was often used to substitute for family labour that was
hired out. At the same time, farmers that did not own modern machinery and equipment
still needed it, and they had to pay VND 320000 per hectare for it, a very large component
of overall farm costs. In hiring this machinery, farmers also had to hire the labour neces-
sary to operate the machinery, and this also helps explain the recourse to hired labour on
small peasant farms. Farms that hired modern machinery and the labour necessary to oper-
ate it did so from rich peasants. Therefore, rich peasants were receiving income from land,
labour and machinery.
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5.2 Case 2
5.2.1 The data
The data used in this section comes from a field survey in three exclusive paddy-
producing districts of one province of the Mekong Delta during April and May 19985. The
districts surveyed differed from those examined in Case 1. Within each district data was
gathered in individual communes and, in the case of one district, a state farm that, based on
agroecological conditions, visual observation, focus group discussions and production out-
comes, appeared to be reasonably representative of the district. Within each commune
residences were randomly selected for the survey. In total, 100 households were adminis-
tered the short closed question survey examining the input choices and output outcomes of
the 1997-98 winter-spring paddy crop. Once again, the sampling procedure appears to have
produced a set of data that is reasonably consistent with that generated by other surveys in
the Mekong Delta.
5.2.2. The results of the survey
Table 7 describes the land, labour and machinery inputs, and yields, experienced
during the 1997-98 winter-spring paddy crop. In the sample, the average size of a farm was
14.6 cong. The distribution of farm sizes displayed in Table 7 shows that 50 per cent of the
farms in the sample were less than 15 cong, and that only 9 per cent of the farms in the
sample had holdings of 25 cong or more. The distribution of farms in the sample is thus
broadly similar to that of Case 1, and indeed with the distribution of farms in the Mekong
Delta. However, in the sample there was no recorded leasing of land either in or out. Thus,
the sample consists of only the Vietnamese equivalent of owner-occupiers.
Table 7 demonstrates that an average of 87 labour days per hectare was devoted to
the winter-spring rice crop. Although family labour was important for the production of the
crop, the purchase of labour-power was very important. Almost 73 per cent of labour re-
quirements of farms were met through the hiring of labour from the local labour market.
Although family labour inputs increase with the size of the holding and then start to reduce
                                                
5 The survey was conducted by Pham Le Thong for their MA thesis, organized under the auspicies of the
Vietnamese-Dutch Project for MA Programme in Development Economics, and is available in the Project
Library.
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as farm size exceeds 15 cong, there is also a clear linear relationship between labour hiring
and size of farm. As noted above, while the use of hired labour was relatively high on
small farms, the motivation behind the use of labour-power is different between the richer
peasants and small peasants. For the small peasants, hired labour was often used to substi-
tute for family labour that was hired out. Again, if the commodification of labour and the
concomitant development of the labour market is a key structural feature of the develop-
ment of capitalism (Lenin, 1968), it would appear that rural capitalism is emerging.
In terms of machinery, farmers used modern machinery for an average period of 24
hours during the 1998 winter-spring paddy crop. Table 7 demonstrates a clear positive re-
lationship between farm size and use of modern machinery, with farm of 30 cong or more
using more than 12 times the amount of modern machinery of that used by the smallest
farms. The simple correlation coefficient between average size and use of modern machin-
ery stands at 0.985, indicating the strength of the relationship. Moreover, larger farms
owned more machinery and equipment while farmers that did not own modern machinery
and equipment still needed to hire it and the labour necessary to operate it. Farms that hired
modern machinery and the labour necessary to operate it did so from rich peasants. There-
fore, rich peasants were receiving income from land, labour and machinery.
Table 7 also demonstrates a positive relationship between yields per hectare and
size of farm. Across the sample, the average yield is 6458 kilograms per hectare. However,
this average masks wide variation. The smallest farms have an average yield of only 1393
kilograms per hectare, while the largest farms have an average yield of some 16000 kilo-
grams per hectare, a productivity record that is more than ten times that of the smallest
farms. Moreover, larger farms are not just the most productive but are also the farms with
the heaviest reliance upon hired labour and modern machinery. Indeed, the simple correla-
tion coefficient between modern machinery and yields stands at 0.978, indicating the sig-
nificance of the relationship. Clearly, within the sample, there appears, as in Case 1, to be
an emergent group of rich peasants with larger landholdings, larger amounts of capital
stock, and larger use of hired labour.
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5.3 The inverse relationship in the Mekong Delta
Tables 6 and 7 tentatively suggest that the technical coefficients of production can
be differentiated on the basis of the size of operational holding, and that such differentia-
tion is having an affect on productivity. In Table 6, there is an admittedly weak positive
relationship between farm size and yields per hectare. Although weak, and not statistically
significant, this positive relationship nonetheless reinforces the argument of the previous
section that the main source of agrarian accumulation in the period following decollectivi-
zation has been the purchase of modern machinery and equipment. In Table 7 a similar re-
lationship is found, but this time the result does appear to have statistical significance. The
transformation of property rights during the 1980s that facilitated agrarian accumulation
appears to have led not only to differentiation in ownership of land use certificates but also
differentiation in the technical coefficients of production on farms of different sizes. The
evidence is consistent with, but not conclusive proof of, the class-theoretic approach to the
inverse relationship. The separation of the direct producers from the means of production,
a process that is embodied in differential ownership of land and capital inputs, is the key
structural feature of the development of the capitalist mode of production, as it is separa-
tion that fosters the emergence of exploitation. Differentiation may thus in turn explain
why the presence of an inverse relationship is not substantiated in these two cases, as
might be expected in a smallholder rice society such as the Mekong Delta. Farm produc-
tivity in larger sized farms may be becoming linked to the scale of production, rather than
the compulsion of survival.
One final point can be made about the emerging class of rich peasants that may be
appearing in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. As noted, these rich peasants obtain income
from land, labour and machinery. There has thus been a diversification of their livelihood
strategy. However, this diversification is not one that has been forced upon them. Rather,
diversification represents a response to underlying processes that have altered the land and
non-land means of production of the households and has fostered the emergence of rural
labour markets and hence labour-power (Ellis, 2000: 55-57). In this sense then diversifica-
tion is a logical outcome.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has asked whether there is an inverse relationship between size of farm
and output per unit of land in rural Vietnam. The paper began by briefly reviewing the lit-
erature on the inverse relationship, and suggested that the class-theoretic approach devel-
oped by Dyer (1997) offered a more convincing account of why or why not an inverse re-
lationship might be witnessed. The paper then noted the process of decollectivization in
Vietnamese agriculture during the 1980s, and the impact of this transformation on the rural
relations of production. Some evidence appeared to indicate that access to land was be-
coming increasingly stratified. At the same time, it appeared that changes in the choice of
technique had also occurred. It was demonstrated that agrarian production and productivity
were unleashed as a result of these changes. Decomposing the sources of accumulation in
the post-1988 period, it was demonstrated that purchased machinery and equipment were
an important source of growth. Evidence from the Mekong Delta indicated that farms of
different sizes appeared to utilize different technical coefficients of production, and that
these differences in production systems appeared to have an effect on yields. As a conse-
quence, an inverse relationship between size of farm and output per unit of land could not
be substantiated. Rather, it appeared that processes of peasant class differentiation might be
underway, with the apparent emergence of a stratum of rich peasants with relatively larger
landholdings, relatively larger quantities of capital stock, relatively greater recourse to
hired labour-power, and larger yields per unit of land. These rich peasants could be set
alongside the great mass of the small peasantry, with relatively smaller landholdings, rela-
tively smaller quantities of capital stock, relatively lesser recourse to hired labour-power,
and lower yields per unit of land.
In Vietnam, the World Bank, the state, and the CPV have all stressed the need to
diversify agricultural production and develop rural non-farm employment (World Bank,
1998). As stated by the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and UNDP (2000: 12),
‘Vietnam needs to adopt the a seemingly paradoxical stance of giving a high priority to
raising agricultural productivity while recognizing that success can come only as agricul-
ture declines as an employer of labor’. The findings of this paper suggest that an enthusi-
asm for rural diversification should be set alongside the processes underpinning the diver-
sification process. In other words, is the process of agrarian change making diversification
24
possible, or is change making diversification necessary? These two possibilities are in line
with Ellis’ (2000: 55) distinction between diversification out of necessity and diversifica-
tion out of choice. The social processes underpinning diversification differ according to the
position of the household in the agrarian structure. The fact that diversification by the rich
peasants is occurring does not necessarily mean that diversification for poorer small peas-
ant households that continue to be engaged in agriculture is necessarily a good thing. If
land, labour and capital markets work to favour rich peasants, there is clearly a need for
caution.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: The agricultural reform process, 1979-2001
Policy measures Objectives Main features Impacts
The 1979 sixth Party ple-
num on ‘some urgent
problems in improvement
of economic management’
To encourage all co-
operatives to fully utilise
available resources to
boost output and help
overcome economic
difficulties and food
shortages
1. Recognizing the im-
portance of economic
incentives in economic
development
2. Widening the auton-
omy of co-operatives
3. Accepting aspects of
a market economy such
as market-determined
prices
The Do Son experiment
was recognized and
other co-operatives
were allowed to ex-
periment in contracting
out land to members for
family production.
Food production recov-
ered.
Directive 100 of 1981 on
‘Output contracts to la-
bour groups and individu-
als’
To provide more eco-
nomic incentives to
farmers so that the effi-
ciency of resource use
improved, output would
grow, and the 1980 food
crisis would not be re-
peated.
The co-operative con-
tracted out land to house-
holds against an output
quota to be returned back.
The cooperative retained
overall control of the pro-
duction process.  Income
distribution shifted from a
per head quota to a labour
force participation basis.
Farmers received
greater freedom to allo-
cate family labour and
dispose of output in
excess of the quota.
Famers’ income im-
proved in both cash and
kind.
The 1983 Agricultural Tax
Ordinance
To unify and rationalise
the tax base across the
country, to encourage
farmers to utilise fallow
land, and to expand
cropped area by both
extensive and intensive
means.
Agricultural tax shifted
from a focus on output
and area to a focus on
quality, area and average
yield.  The tax was in
paddy, and the rate was
fixed at 10 % of average
output for 5 years.  Re-
claimed land was not
subject to tax for 3 to 5
years.
The total sown area
increased.  Fallow land
was brought back into
use, and land was re-
claimed for annual and
perennial crops.
The 1986 doi moi (reno-
vation) programme
To transform a centrally
planned economy into a
state-regulated market
economy, in order to
surmount an ongoing
economic and social
crisis.
The state officially recog-
nized the co-existence of
five economic sectors:
state, state capitalist,
capitalist, cooperative and
private.  The leading role
of the state sector, and the
regulatory role of the
state, was emphasized.
Agriculture slowed into
stagnation, due to inap-
propriate incentive
structures and natural
calamaties.
The 1987 partial liberali-
zation of food trade
To create a national
food market capable of
meeting planned food
consumption targets by
smoothing the flow of
food across the country,
subject to state control.
The abolition of the pol-
icy of district level food
self-sufficiency in place
since the late 1970s.  State
companies retained their
monopoly in the inter-
provincial shipment of
food.
Food imbalances were
reduced across the
country as food pro-
duction in surplus-
producing regions was
encouraged.  Transac-
tion costs in food trad-
ing were greatly re-
duced.
Resolution 10 of 1988 on
‘Renewal of economic
management in agricul-
To overcome the food
crisis of 1987 and early
1988, the management
The farm household for-
mally became the basic
economic unit in the rural
The food crisis ceased.
Farmers gained greater
control over the alloca-
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ture’ and Resolution 6 of
1989 on the farm house-
hold
and production of agri-
culture was to be radi-
cally reorganized to
encourage rapid growth
by transforming the ex-
isting structure into a
diversified, commodity-
based agriculture.
economy, with co-
operatives acting to sup-
port farm households.
Co-operatives contracted
out land to farm house-
holds for 15 years for
annual crops, and 40
years for perennial crops.
Capital stock and working
capital were rented or
bought by farm house-
holds from co-operatives.
Farmers had to pay agri-
cultural taxes and irriga-
tion fees to the govern-
ment.  Output quotas are
retained, but eased, al-
lowing farm households
to keep a minimum of 40
per cent of average out-
put.  The quota was fixed
for 5 years.   Private food
marketing was explicitly
recognized.
tion and utilization of
land, labour and finan-
cial resources, and col-
lective agriculture
quickly lost its mean-
ing.
The trade and price liber-
alization of 1989
To end the subsidy re-
gime used in the econ-
omy, and thus further
spur the growth of the
market.
Most macro- and micro-
economic prices were
liberalized, albeit to a
differing extent.  The
quota procurement system
was ended.  Price controls
were ended.  The ex-
change rate was devalued.
Positive real interest rates
were introduced.  Internal
trade was liberalized.  The
private sector was al-
lowed entry into a wider
range of business activi-
ties, except strategic sec-
tors.  The private sector
was allowed entry into
international trade, except
in strategic goods such as
rice and fertilizer.
Agriculture grew rap-
idly, and in particular
rice production, trans-
forming Vietnam from
being a net rice im-
porter into being the
third largest rice ex-
porter in the world.
Farm incomes in-
creased, and rural living
conditions improved in
absolute terms.
The rural financial re-
forms of 1990 to 1995,
and in particular the
authorization of lending to
rural households in 1993.
The Vietnam Bank for
Agriculture and Rural
Development (VBARD)
was established in 1990
to meet the growing
credit needs of farmers,
traders and agribusiness.
The People’s Credit
Funds (PCFs) were es-
tablished between 1993
and 1995 to mobilize
idle savings by provid-
The VBARD took over
the State Bank of Viet-
nam’s  (SBV) rural net-
work of branches and
expanded it.  Acquiring
credit from the VBARD
required collateral, and
land use certificates were
the most commonly ac-
cepted form of collateral.
Mass organizations were
widely used to distribute
Private credit’s share in
total credit rose from 10
% in 1991 to 82 % in
1995.  Increasing num-
bers of farms got access
to credit, allowing them
to sustain the expansion
of production, and de-
velop processing, stor-
age and transport ca-
pacities.  This speeded
up the commercialisa-
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ing local access to sav-
ings institutions, and to
provide local access to
credit for borrowing
households and busi-
nesses.
The Vietnam Bank for
the Poor (VBP) was
established in 1995 to
contribute to hunger
eradication and poverty
alleviation.
credit and collect repay-
ments, in order to reduce
transaction costs and risk.
PCFs are member-owned
and seek to recover the
costs of their operation.
The VBP is a non-profit
bank that operates
through the VBARD net-
work but which receives
support from the SBV, in
that it operates using
SBV-subsidized interest
rates.
tion of agriculture in
both the domestic and
international arenas.
The PCFs and VBP
allow many to escape
from poverty.
The 1993 Land Law and
the 1993 land use tax or-
dinance
To provide farm house-
holds with more rights
over contracted land,
and in particular to se-
cure long-term tenurial
arrangements, in order
to improve the alloca-
tion and utilization of
land, encourage invest-
ment, and increase the
reclamation of land.
Land tenure was extended
to 20 years for annual
crops and 50 years for
perennial crops.  Farm
households could ex-
change, transfer, lease,
inherit and mortgage land
use rights.  Households
were limited to 3 hectares
per farm for annual crops.
Agricultural land use tax
was reduced from an av-
erage of 10 % of yearly
output to 7 % of yearly
output.  Perennial crops
farmed on newly re-
clamed land were ex-
empted from tax.
The total sown area
increased, especially for
perennial industrial and
export crops.  Invest-
ment in land increased,
boosting fertility and
yields.  The two con-
tributed to high agri-
cultural growth rates.
The Price Stabilization
Funds (PSFs) of 1993.
To stabilize agricultural
incomes and consumer
supplies during periods
of sharp price flucuta-
tions.
Exporters and importers
were subjected to an ex-
cess profit tax.  The gov-
ernment used these reve-
nues to subsidize credit
for state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) so that they
would continue to procure
when farm gate prices fell
and transport inputs and
outputs to remoter, food
deficit and disadvantaged
regions.
The procedures for re-
leasing the revenues to
the SOEs were com-
plex.  Moreover, those
SOEs that received re-
sources were not those
that bought and sold
agricultural inputs and
outputs to and from
farmers.  Thus, the re-
sults were poor.
Decision 250 of 1998 To allow private com-
panies to export rice
A proportion of the rice
export quota was to be
licensed to five private
companies.
State owned enterprises
remained dominant in
rice exports.
Resolution 6 of 1998 on
the farm economy and the
1998 Land Law
To recognize the posi-
tion of farm households
operating holdings in
excess of the legal 3-
hectare maximum by
legalizing the role of
land accumulation and
The operation of the land
market was further clari-
fied, with provisions re-
garding the leasing, trans-
fer, and accumulation of
land in excess of 3-
hectare ceilings.  Legal
Too soon to say.
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larger scale farms in the
agricultural sector.
restrictions on the hiring
of labour were to be re-
moved, with negotiable
salaries between employ-
ers and employees.  In-
come tax rates for large-
scale farms were to be cut
from 30 % to 5 %.
The agricultural trade lib-
eralization of 2001
To end the rice export
quota and the fertilizer
import quota
All firms were to be al-
lowed to export rice and
import fertilizer.
Too soon to say.
Source: adapted from van Donge, Whie and Nghia (1999); Vietnam Investment Review (various issues).
Table 2:
Landholdings for all households with agricultural land in square metres, by expenditure quintiles, 1998
Area of landholdings
Expenditure quintiles All land Annual crop land Perennial crop land
I (poorest) 6437 3600 613
II 6953 3928 845
III 7138 4625 1016
IV 6928 4414 1485
V (richest) 9856 5081 3527
Note: Landholding includes land rented-out but excludes land rented-in
Source: Government of Vietnam-Donor-NGO Poverty Working Group (PWG) (1999): Table 2.5.
Table 3:
Key indicators of production inputs
Input 1979-1981 1995-1997
Arable land per capita, in hectares 0.11 0.07
Land under cereal production, in
thousands of hectares (*)
5963 7799
Irrigated land as a share of crop-
land
24.1 31.0
Fertilizer use per hectare of ar-
able land, in hundreds of grams
302 2566
Tractors per 100 hectares of ar-
able land
38 178
Note: (*) is for 1996-1998.
Source: World Bank (2000): Table 3.2.
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Table 4:
Public investment in agriculture, 1992-1998
Year Public invest-
ment as a % of
GDP
Public agri-
cultural in-
vestment as a
% of GDP
Public invest-
ment as a % of
the government
budget
Public agri-
cultural in-
vestment as a
% of the gov-
ernment budget
Public agri-
cultural in-
vestment as a
% of agricul-
tural GDP
1992 Not available 0.77 Not available 4.13 2.30
1993 Not available 0.63 Not available 3.14 2.16
1994 Not available 0.98 Not available 4.60 3.47
1995 5.5 1.27 22.84 5.73 4.46
1996 6.3 Not available 26.52 Not available Not available
1997 6.7 0.88 29.12 3.79 3.36
1998 7.1 0.99 32.64 4.79 3.73
Source: interpolated from Government-Donor Working Group on Public Expenditure Review (PER)
(2001): Table 1.1 and 3.2
Table 5:
Accounting for agricultural growth, 1976-1995
Contribution to output growth
Period Gross out-
put growth
Sown area Labour Fertilizer Livestock Machinery Factor pro-
ductivity
1976-80 2.03 1.57 0.74 -1.36 0.09 1.16 -0.17
1980-84 6.57 0.32 0.92 3.31 0.38 0.54 1.11
1984-88 2.40 0.51 0.66 0.15 0.44 -0.75 1.38
1988-95 5.03 0.97 0.65 0.97 0.22 2.18 0.02
Source: Jansen (1998): Table 2.
Table 6:
Inputs and yields in the Mekong Delta, winter-spring crop, 1999
Size of op-
erational
holding
Proportion
of observa-
tions
Total labour
days per
hectare
Hired labour
as a share of
total labour
Fertilizer
use per hec-
tare (VND
000)
Machinery
rental cost
per hectare,
(VND 000)
Value of
owned ma-
chinery and
equipment
(VND 000)
Yield per
hectare, in
metric tons
Less than 5
cong
27.4 78 38.4 1149 1046.5 1438 6.05
5 to 10 cong 31.1 66 39.4 1360 957.7 1681 6.28
10 to 20
cong
30.4 61 45.9 1142 994.1 2233 6.45
More than
20 cong
11.1 63 44.4 1030 877 2425 6.46
Average 67 41.8 1199 985 1917.5 6.29
Source: compiled from Binh (2000): Tables 11, 7C, 8C, 10C, 26, 31 and 33
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Table 7:
Inputs and yields in the Mekong Delta, winter-spring crop, 1998
Size of op-
erational
holding, in
cong
Proportion
of observa-
tions
Average
area, in cong
Family
labour, in
mandays
Hired
labour, in
mandays
Machinery
utilization,
in hours
Yield per
hectare, in
metric tons
0-5 19 3.5 21.51 10.67 4.11 1.39
5-10 21 6.8 31.60 23.45 5.75 3.00
10->15 10 12.0 51.09 48.67 15.91 5.67
15->20 3 18.4 31.75 62.00 28.66 7.77
20->25 38 22.1 15.65 99.72 41.69 9.84
25->30 8 26.0 9.88 130.81 38.99 10.79
30+ 1 32.0 2.00 146.00 53.33 16.00
Average 100 14.6 23.54 63.50 23.94 6.46
Source: compiled from Thong (1998).
Source: author’s calculations from Food and Agriculture Organization, 19996.
                                                
6 Production data obtained from the Food and Agriculture Organization’s web site for the pre-1975 period is
for both the northern and the southern halves of Vietnam. This data appears to be the only available consis-
tent agricultural data set for the entire of Vietnam from the early 1960s to the present.
Figure 1:  Per capita foodgrain availability, 1961-1997
150
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Year
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 a
va
ila
bi
lit
y,
 k
ilo
gr
am
s
Figure 2:
Growth rates in foodgrain production, 1962-1997
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